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CONDIT IONALS AND THEORY CHANGE:  
REV IS IONS,  EXPANSIONS,  AND ADDIT IONS*  
ABSTRACT. This paper dwells upon formal models of changes of beliefs, or theories, 
which are expressed in languages containing a binary conditional connective. After defi- 
ning the basic concept of a (non-trivial) belief revision model. I present a simple proof 
of G~irdenfors's (1986) triviality theorem. I claim that on a proper understanding of this 
theorem we must give up the thesis that consistent revisions ('additions') are to be 
equated with logical expansions. If negated or 'might' conditionals are interpreted on the 
basis of 'autoepistemic omniscience', or if autoepistemic modalities (Moore) are admitted, 
even more severe triviality results ensue. It is argued that additions cannot be philosoph- 
ically construed as ~parasitic' (Levi) on expansions. In conclusion I outline somed logical 
consequences of the fact that we must not expect 'monotonic' revisions in languages 
including conditionals. 
1. BELIEF REVISION MODELS 
Beliefs and theories are expressed by way of sentences of a certain 
language. In this paper I shall presuppose a language L that contains 
the operators of propositional logic ( - ,  &, v ,  ~)  and allows the for- 
mulation of conditionals of the form 'If A then B'. As in natural 
language, conditionals will not be given a special syntactical treatment 
in advance. In particular I do not exclude negations of conditionals. 
Belief revision models (BRMs) are formal models of the dynamics 
of epistemic states or theories. A belief set, or theory, is a set of 
sentences of a language L which is closed under a logic (consequence 
relation, derivability relation) ~- for L. The logic will be supposed to 
include classical propositional logic, in particular modus ponens, and 
the deduction theorem is required to hold for F-. 
At first we shall consider only one kind of theory change, viz., 
so-called 'revisions'. By the revision of a theory K we mean the assimi- 
lation of a sentence A into K. Theory revisions figure, for example, in 
processing a new piece of factual information or in following the lines 
of a hypothetical rgument. We can distinguish two cases. If A is 
consistent witb~ K (under F-), the revision seems to be a matter of 
routine. But if A is inconsistent with K (under F-), then the affair will 
become tricky. It is for the sake of such belief-contravening changes 
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that BRMs were introduced. The following model for theory change, 
however, is intended to cover both kinds of revisions. It is important 
that revisions ought to be economical or minimal, i.e., they should not 
waste information contained in K without need. 
This paper is based on a simplified form of the BRMs initiated by 
Peter G~irdenfors. A belief revision model, or BRM, is an ordered 
couple (K, ,) such that K is a set of belief sets and ,: K x Sent(L)~K 
is a function assigning a revision ,(K,  A) to any belief set K~ K and 
any L-sentence A. We shall abbreviate ,(K, A) by K~ in what follows. 
K* again is a belief set and is to denote the minimal revision needed 
to assimilate A into K. We presuppose that ,  is intensional: For all A 
and B equivalent under F, K* = K}. 
To make sure that BRMs really at least do in part what we want 
them to do, we shall require that all BRMs satisfy the following criteria 
of success, of identity and of consistency: 
(S) A ~ K*. 
(I) If K is F-consistent and A ~ K, then KA** = K. 
(C) If both K and A are F-consistent, so is K*. 
While (S) and (I) appear to be beyond controversy, (C) could be 
disputed.1 If the sentence A in (C) is hopelessly out of question then 
an epistemic or 'theoretical' breakdown of K into inconsistency might 
be regarded as possible. Although I do not think that (C) really is too 
strong, one might restrict this requirement to sentences A that are 
'intuitively innocent'. The arguments to come would have to undergo 
a similar restriction at various places, but, so I believe, they would 
suffer no loss of their persuasive power. For this reason I will employ 
the simpler and still plausible requirement (C). 
Notice that (S), (I), and (C) are criteria for BRMs. I have omitted 
the quantificational prefixes VKE K VA ~ Sentences(L) only for the 
sake of simplicity. They should not pass out of the reader's mind. 
We are interested in BRMs that can serve as models of the potential 
beliefs or theories of human beings (and artificial intelligence systems). 
The following definitions are motivated by the fact that believers and 
theorists are not omniscient. 
Let (KI *) be a BRM, and A and B be sentences of L. A belief set 
K ~ K is called A-ignorant if neither A nor -A  is in K; it is called 
A-B-ignorant if no (non-tautological) truth-functional combination of 
A and B is in K, i.e., (provided that A and B are logically independent), 
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if ne i therAvB norAv-B  nor -AvB nor -Av -B is  in K. A 
BRM (K, ,) is called non-trivial (weakly non-trivial) if there exists a 
belief set K in K and L-sentences A and B (an L-sentence A) such 
that K is A-B-ignorant (A-ignorant). Clearly, A-B-ignorance implies 
A-ignorance, and non-triviality implies weak non-triviality. 
I assume that any BRM intuitively should be non-trivial and satisfy 
(S), (I), and (C). Nevertheless, I shall make explicit where these presup- 
positions are actually made use of in the following. 
2. GARDENFORS'S  TR IV IAL ITY  THEOREM 
Perhaps the most important application of BRMs to date has been the 
analysis of conditionals. Pioneer work was done by G~irdenfors (1978). 
The key to the interpretation of conditionals is the so-called Rarnsey 
test. It originated in a footnote of Frank P. Ramsey's (1931, p. 247) 
and can very naturally be expressed as a criterion on BRMs in languages 
including conditionals: 
(R) 'If A then B' E K iff B E K*. 
G~irdenfors developed the analysis of conditionals by means of (R) and 
his concept of BRMs very far. But recently he himself has struck his 
own approach aheavy blow. In G~irdenfors (1986), he stated the follow- 
ing now notorious triviality theorem: There is no non-trivial BRM that 
satisfies (S), (C), (R), and (p).2 
Here (P) is a prima facie most plausible criterion of preservation: If
the sentence A with respect o which the revision of K is to be made 
is consistent with K, then K* loses nothing of the contents of K. More 
formally, 
(P) If -A  E K, then K C K*. 
I would like to present a very simple proof for the theorem which is 
easier to grasp than the proof in G~rdenfors (1986). Its perspicuity may 
aid us in seeing 'the reasons' for the unexpected rise of triviality. As 
may easily be verified by the reader, all results gained from the follow- 
ing proof can be carried over to G~rdenfors's original proof. 
Let (K, ,) be a non-trivial BRM and let K E K be A-B-ignorant. The 
gist of the proof is illustrated by Figure 1. 
94 HANS ROTT 
'If ~A then B' 'If -A  then ~B'  
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Here K~(K~vB, K~,,-B) denotes the expansion of K by A (by A v B 
and A v -B ,  respectively), as defined by 
(Def+) K~ is the set of k-consequences of K U {A}, or equivalently, 3 
K~4 = def {C: A ---> C ~ K}. 
Note that A ~ K~ and K C_ K~. 
Let us now exploit the premises of Gfirdenfors's triviality theorem 
and write down the proof in detail. 
(1) A v B ¢ K~vB (Def+) 
(2) A ¢ K)vB A-B-ignorance of K, (Def+) 
(3) A v B ~ (K~vB)*A (1), (2), (P) 
(4) -A  E (K~vB)*A (S) 
(5) B E (K~,vB)*A (3), (4), (g~vB)eA is a 
belief set 
(6) 'If ~A then B' E K~B (5), (R) 
KAv B C_ KA (7) + + (Def+) 
(8) 'If -A  then B' ~ K~ (6), (7) 
(9) 'If -A  then -B 'E  K~' analogous to (1)-(8), with 
-B  substituted for B 
The provisional results (8) and (9) to the effect that both 'If -A  then 
B' and 'If -A  then -B '  are in K~ conflict with (R) and (C): 
(10) B, -B  ~ (K~)*A (8), (9), (R) 
(11) (g~)~*a is inconsistent (10) 
(12) -A  is consistent A-B-ignorance of K 
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(13) K~ is consistent A-B-ignorance of K 
(14) (K))~*A is consistent (12), (13), (C) 
(15) Contradiction! (11), (14). 
Now it looks as though we had managed to show, by using exactly the 
criteria (P), (S), (R), and (C) which are mentioned by G~irdenfors, that 
only trivial BRMs can meet all four of these criteria. 
But have we really been successful? Haven't we overlooked anything? 
We have. We forgot that in all these criteria we have quantifiers ranging 
over all K in K. We applied them to expansions quite thoughtlessly. So 
we tacitly presupposed that if K is in K, then this K contains the 
expansions of K as well. G~irdenfors's theorem must read thus: 
THEOREM 1 (G~irdenfors). There is no non-trivial BRM (K, ,) satis- 
fying (S), (C), (R), and (P), that is closed under expansions. 
G~rdenfors (1986, p. 85) mentions the closure under expansions only 
as an incidental technical presupposition. This runs the risk of begging 
the question in favour of (P), since, as we shall shortly see, the most 
plausible justification of closure under expansions entails (P). More- 
over, at least (S), (C), and (P) appear to be less problematic than this 
presupposition. We are not facing, as G~irdenfors assumes, a dilemma 
with two horns labelled (R) and (P), but the theorem sets us an ad- 
ditional task. Why should expansions be in BRMs? The obvious, and 
perhaps only answer to this question is: Because expansions are a 
subspecies of revisions. Let us quote from G~irdenfors (1988, p. 54): 
The normal application area of a revision process is when the input A contradicts what 
is already in K, i.e., -A  ~ K. However, in order to have the revision function defined 
for all argmnents, we can easily extend it to cover the case when -A ~! K. In this case, 
the revision is, of course, identified with an expansion. 
The suggestion therefore is 
(E) If -A  ~ K, then K~ = K~. 
Then the closure of BRMs under (consistent) expansions i naturally 
justified by the very idea and definition of a BRM. Moreover, we can 
now dispense with (P), which is implied by (E). The theorem can be 
reformulated thus: 
COROLLARY 1. There is no non-trivial BRM satisfying (S), (C), 
(R), and (E). 
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In the face of the dilemma stated in this way, G~irdenfors would 
presumably plead against (R) and for (E). My aim willd be, however, 
to show that (R) should be retained and (E) should be given up. 
Before turning to a more systematic investigation of the relation 
between revisions K3 (with -A  ~ K) and expansions K~, we note that 
a certain way out is blocked. The Ramsey test (R) for 'If A then B' does 
not require A to be relevant for B. In particular, it is a consequence of
(I) that 'If A then B' may, and must, already be accepted when A and 
B are regarded as true. Rott (1986, pp. 351-52) indicates three vari- 
ations on (R) as candiates for shunning this intuitive inadequacy: 
(R1) ' I fA thenB 'EK  iff BEK~&B~:K .  
(R2) 'If A then B' ~ K iff B E K~ & B ¢ K*A. 
(R3) 'If A then B' ¢ K iff B E (KS)5~. 
In (R3), K} denotes the contraction of K with respect o B: The most 
economical change of K that is necessary to obtain a belief set not 
including B. Like revisions, contractions are required to meet certain 
criteria. Here we will only need the criteria of success and identity for 
contractions: 
(S-) B ¢ K}, unless FB. 
(I-) If B ~ K, then K5 = K. 
G~irdenfors (1987) showed that (R1)-(R3) do not lead us out of the 
dilemma. Applying (R1)-(R3) in Figure 1, one realizes that, first, 'If 
-A  then ( - )B '  remains in K)v(_),~: for (R1) we need to show that 
( - )B  ~ K which is true by supposition; for (R2) we need to show that 
( - )B  (E (K~v(-)B)* what follows from (E); and owing to (I-), there is 
no change at all for (R3). Secondly, from the fact that both 'If -A  
then B' and 'If ~A then -B ' ,  we get the contradiction for (R1)-(R3) 
just as for (R) (for (R3) we need (I-) once more). Thus, we have the 
following 
COROLLARY 2. There is no non-trivial BRM satisfying 
(a) (S), (C), (R1), and (E) or 
(b) (S), (C), (R2), and (E) or 
(c) (S), (C), (R3), (E), and ( I ) .  
Hence, installing a relevance condition in the Ramsey test by way of 
the three variants above does not matter greatly in the present context. 
We shall keep to the original Ramsey test (R) subsequently. 4 
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3. EXPANSIONS AND ADDIT IONS 
Having had to put up with the BRMs' closure under expansions in the 
past section has been unpleasant in some degree. We can gain a better 
understanding of where additional conditions which are hidden in (E) 
come in, if we work with consistent revisions, or briefly additions, K3 
where -A  ~K.  It is convenient o choose a new notation: in the 
following, K.~ denotes the revision of K when it is presupposed, or 
made sure, that -A  is not in K. (P) and (E), for instance, can then be 
reformulated as 
(P) K _c 
(E) Kd = K~. 
Splitting (E) into halves will assist us in our later arguments: 
(El)  K~ _c_ Kd. 
(E2) K~ C_- K~. 
Let us now recast the proof of the triviality theorem. The new idea 
is represented in Figure 2. 
' If -A  then B' 'If -A  then -B '  
? /> / r/)) ? 
K~,,B Kd~- B 
? \o /© ? 
K2 
Fig. 2. 
On trying to substitute '°' for ' + ' systematically in steps (1)-(14) in the 
above proof, we realize that additional assumptions are required at 
exactly two points, where we referred to (Def+). In line (1) we can 
use (S). But in line (2) we need (E2), and in order to make step (7) 
we need a condition that I will call rnonotonicity of additions: 
(Ma)  K~BCK~.  
Those who, in contrast o G~irdenfors, are suspicious of condition (P) 
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may wish to replace lines (3)-(5) by a new chain of reasoning making 
use of a condition that can be called conjunctivi O,of additions: 
(CA) (Kd)~ = Kd~B. 
Notice that here it must be checked thrice whether ,o, is allowed to 
stand in place of ,,,.s Instead of (3)-(5) above (,o, being substituted for 
'+') we would come up with 
(3') (KdvB)~A = K2AaB A-B-ignorance of K, (2), (CA) 
(4') B E K2A~B (S) 
(5 ' )  B E (KdvB)°A (3'), (4') 
Another variation: (CA) would allow us to waive (MA) if we should 
prefer to employ (P) again. Line (7) above would have to be replaced 
by the following chain: 
(7') -A  ~ K~vB A-B-ignorance of K, (Def+), (E2) 
(7") (K2vB)2 = K2 (7'), ( ca )  
(7") K2vB C K~ (7"), (P) 
(MA) and (CA) correspond to the monotonicity and conjunctivity of 
expansions which follow from (Def+). These conditions are explicitly 
listed in Peter G~irdenfors's papers (1986; 1987) on the triviality results. 
But what is gained or lost by the various proof variants? In order to 
get a clear understanding of the mutual dependencies of the conditions 
proposed, let us collect them all in a little lemma. 
(a) (E) ¢:5 (El) & (E2). 
(b) (E) ~ (MA), (E) ~ (CA). 
(c) (El) ¢, (P) (S°). 
(d) (MA) & (I) ~ (P). 
(e) (CA) & (S) & (I) ~ (P). 
(f) (CA) & (S) & (I) & (E2) ~ (MA). 
(S °) in (C) is meant o be the restriction of (S) to consistent revisions: 
(S °) A E K~ 
Proof of the lemma. (a) Obvious. 
(b) As ~- is a conservative extension of propositional logic and as 
every belief set K is closed under k, we have for all K: if (A v B) --0 C 
LEMMA: 
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is in K, so is A --, C; and A ~ (B --+ C) is in K iff (A & B) ~ C is in K. 
Recalling (Def+), it is now evident hat (E) implies (MA) and (CA). 
(c) From left to right: for all belief sets K, A---~A is in K, and if 
B is in K, so is A--,B. Hence KU{A}C_K~. hence, by (El), also 
K U {-4} C K~, hence we have (P) and (S°). From right to left: (P) and 
(S °) together imply K U {.4} C_ K~. Since K~ is the smallest set closed 
under F which contains K U {A}, and since K~ as a belief set must be 
closed under F, we have K~ C K~, i.e., (El). 
(d) Take -A  or T as the B mentioned in (MA). 
(e) Let -A  q~ K and B ~ K. Then, by (I) and (CA), K2 = (K~)~ = 
K~ae. (The last term denotes an addition, since by supposition 
- (A&B)  q~K.) By (S), we have BE/~as ,  hence B~K~,  which 
proves (P). 
(f) Owing to (e), we may use (P). Let A ~ K. From (P) and (CA), 
o - o o__  we get KAvB G (KAvB)A  -- Kd. Now we are done, if we can show that 
(K~vB),~ really is a twofold addition. To accomplish this we have to 
verify that -A  qi KdvB: due to -A  ~ K, we have -A  q2 K~vB, hence, 
by (E2), also ~oA ~ Kd,.B. QED 
It has become evident that more than just (P) is required for the 
triviality proof: On the one hand, we need (MA) or (CA) which are 
logically stronger than (P) (if our basic criteria (S) and (I) are pre- 
supposed); on the other hand we need (E2). (E) has not to be used to 
full extent, but it seems that (E) provides the most natural, and possibly 
the only, motivation of the premises required. 
A number of further consequences for the triviality theorem resulting 
from these observations get clear now. We are not facing the simple 
alternative of giving up either (R) or (P). A third serious candidate for 
cancellation has appeared with (E2), and (P) has to be strengthened to
(CA) or to (MA), both of which also are in want of additional justifi- 
cation. (MA) is a little weaker, since it follows from (CA) given the 
presence of conditions (S), (I), and (E2), which are indispensable in
any case. The most telling form of the triviality result is then cast in 
the following: 
THEOREM 2. There is no non-trivial BRM satisfying (S), (I), (C), 
(R), (MA), and (E2). 
On considering Figure 2 intuitively, one cannot escape the impression 
that 'If -A  then (~)B' should be in K~(-}B,  but not in K~, if K is 
A-B-ignorant. This is to put the blame on (MA), while (R) and (E2) 
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are exonerated in the first instance. The hope, however, that sacrificing 
(MA) saves (E2) is shortlived. The next section offers separate argu- 
ments against both conditions, as well as against (P). Anyhow, (E) 
certainly does not fit any longer. Expansions are not the right method 
to 'add' new sentences if the underlying language contains conditionals 
which are interpreted by the Ramsey test 
4.  AUTOEP ISTEMIC  OMNISCIENCE 
The Ramsey test instructs us to look and see what goes on in KJ~: if B 
is in K~, then - and only then - the conditional 'If A then B' is in K. 
But what is the matter when B is not in K*? I suggest hat we should 
be allowed to put this negative result on record in just the same way 
as we register the positive one. If B is not in K, then, it seems to me, 
we may - and must - reject the conditional, i.e., accept *It is not the 
case that if A then B', or briefly -~If A then B'. Once the idealizations 
involved in belief sets and the Ramsey test are agreed to, there is no 
philosophical reason for repudiating this 'rejectability condition' of 
conditionals, or acceptability condition of negated conditionals. Ideal 
epistemic subjects are omniscient with respect to their own belief 
change. Let us note down the Ramsey-like test for negated conditionals 
formally: 
(R - )  - ° I f  A then B' ¢ K iff B ~ K*. 
In what follows, autoepistemic omniscience (AEO) is the name of the 
principle stating that for every belief set K in every BRM (K, .} and 
every pair of sentences A and B, either ~If A then B' or ~' I f  A then 
B' is in K. 6 Notice again that this is a principle for BRMs. I think 
(AEO) is just as plausible as (R), so I rate it as less plausible than the 
basic criteria (S), (I), and (C), but as more plausible than (P), (E), 
(MA), (E2),'etc. 
An ideal subject's omniscience with reslJect to its own belief change 
entails its omniscience with respect o its own beliefs. The static trace 
of the stronger dynamic requirement is obtained by considering the 
sentences 'If T then A' and ~ 'If T then A', where T is an arbitrary 
tautology or the sentential truth constant. We shall abbreviate these 
sentences by DA and -NA respectively. The basic criterion (I) tells 
us that 2~A and -DA are not referring to genuine revisions of the 
present belief set but to the present belief set itself. Using (AEO) we 
get the following acceptability conditions: 
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(RD) []A ~ K iff A ¢ K. 
(R~[ ] )  ~DCK iff AqiK .  
Again (RQ) and(R-  [2) are criteria that apply to all K in a BRM 
(K, *}. As they are weaker than the corresponding conditions for (ne- 
gated) conditionals (if (I) is presupposed), it hardly needs mentioning 
that there are other ways to discover and justify (RD) and (R ~ D) 
than via the Ramsey test and autoepistemic omniscience. 7 Seen from 
this perspective, the following argument is (at least partly) independent 
from (R). It nevertheless turns against (R)'s 'rivals' in Theorem 2. 
Note incidentally that (R -D) ,  or already (AEO), excludes the in- 
consistent set from any BRM K, since it contains all sentences. To 
avoid a conflict of (R ~ []) with (S), (S) should be restricted in a fashion 
similar to (S-). The new criterion of success then is 
(S) A ~ K 3, unless k ~ A. 
Employing (RN) and (R ~ D), we can attack (P) and (E2) one by 
one.  
THEOREM 3. There is no weakly non-trivial BRM satisfying 
(a) (S), (R~ D), and (P) or 
(b) (S), (RD), (R-~ D), and (E2). 
Proof. Let K ~ K and A ~ Sent(L) be such that A, ~A (E K. 
(a) 
(b) 
(1) - [ ]A~K ACK, (R - [ ] )  
(2) ~-[2A C K2 (1), -A  (E K, (P) 
(3) A 6E K~ (2), (R -  Q) 
(4) A e K2 (S) 
(5) Contradiction! (3), (4). 
(1) ~-DA~K A~K, (R~[] )  
(2) A E K,~ (S) 
(3) F2A ~ K2 (2), (R[]) 
(4) F2A E K~ (3), (E2) 
(5) A--+[~A E K (4), (Def+) 
(6) - [ ]A  --+ ~A ~ K (5), propositional logic 
(7) -A  ~ K (1), (6), propositional logic 
(8) Contradiction! (7), -A  ~ K. 
Now (P) and (E2), and due to the 
both conditions that were relevant in 
lemma (part (d)) also (MA), i.e., 
Theorem 2 have been discredited. 
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Moreover, the lemma (part (c)) shows us that both halves of the thesis 
"consistent revisions are identical with expansions", (El)  and (E2), 
are untenable if epistemic subjects record their current beliefs by means 
of sentences of the form DA and -DA.  
Let us have a closer look at the proof of part (b) of Theorem 3. The 
catch in (E2) is that it makes the derivation of (5) possible: if A --~ NA 
is in K, then K cannot be A-ignorant, as is demonstrated in the proof. 
Thus A --~ DA, or 
(T& A) --~ 'If T then A' 
must not be a sentence scheme derivable in I-. But it is derivable in the 
conditional logic of G~irdenfors (1978). This logic is based on the Ram- 
sey test (R) and on the characteristics of G~irdenforsian BRMs. It has 
(A) (A & B) --~ 'If A then B' 
as an axiom scheme. G~irdenfors shows that (A) is in every belief set 
of a BRM, if this BRM satisfies one half of (I), viz., 
(I1) If A E K, then K C_ K*. 
We have had no doubts about (I). On the other hand, we have seen 
that the axiom scheme (A) admits only trivial BRMs, provided that we 
adopt (R) and (AEO) (or alternatively, (RD) and (R -D) ) .  What 
is the reason that we must not take Gfirdenfors's conditional logic, 
which is identical with David Lewis's (1973) 'official' logic VC, as our 
logic for BRMs? 
The crucial point is this. In his proof that - given (R) - (A) is in 
every belief set K, G~irdenfors utilizes the very same premise which he 
passed over in his triviality proof: the closure of BRMs under expan- 
sions. The only justification for this premise would seem to be the thesis 
that expansions are special cases of revisions, namely additions. But on 
the strength of the inspection of Figure 2, I have argued that the best 
way to interpret Ggrdenfors's own theorem is to conclude that - given 
(R) - additions are not to be identified with expansions. Hence the 
axiom scheme (A) above (as well as other G~irdenforsian axiom 
schemes) is deprived of its basis. (A) should not be an axiom of con- 
ditional ogic. 
As already mentioned in Section 2, (R) and (I) imply the following: 
If A & B is in K, then 'If A then B' is in K. This must of course not 
be confused with (A). On the contrary, we see that it is not warranted 
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to infer from the metatheoretical implication 'For all belief sets K, if 
C is in K, then D is in K' that the corresponding material implication 
C--+ D is included in all belief sets. 
5. 'M IGHT '  CONDIT IONALS 
The 'might' conditional 'If A then -B  might be the case' usually is a 
more natural expression i  the situation described at the beginning of 
Section 4 (when B is not in KX), than the laborious complex sentence 
'It is not the case that if A then B'. Instead of (R-) ,  this suggests the 
following acceptability condition: 
(R~-->)'If A then B might be the case' ~ K iff -B  ~ K*. 
Accordingly, we define CA by 'If T then A might be the case' and get 
(RO) CASK iff ~A~K.  
It is easy to verify that part (a) of Theorem 3 can be proven with (RO) 
in just the same way as with (R-[~).  Part (b) requires the (scarcely 
problematic) additional condition that -½A and C-A  be mutually 
exchangeable. 
Let us now review a few analyses of 'might' conditionals suggested 
in the recent literature, and test how they fit in with the definitions 
above. Lewis (1973) favours a 'not-would-not' reading which can be 
turned into the following acceptability condition: 
(NWN) 'If A then B might be the case' ~ K iff 
'It is not the case that if A then B' ¢ K. 
Of course, (NWN) is immediately supported by definitions (R<>--~) and 
(R-) .  G~irdenfors (1988, pp. 154-156) accepts (R~-+), but not (NWN), 
because he regards - ' I f  A then B' as strictly stronger than 'If A then 
B might be the case'. The argument he advances in favour of this thesis, 
however, is a bit weak, and he does not give any comment on the 
acceptability ofnegated conditionals. So his rejection of (NWN) cannot 
wholly convince me. 
Lewis (1986, pp. 63-64) contrasts (NWN) with the 'would-be- 
possible' reading which mirrors the syntactical surface structure of 
'might' conditionals best: 
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(WBP) 'If A then B might be the case' E K iff 
'If A then ~B' ~ K. 
In our model, (WBP) turns out to be as correct as (NWN): by (R) the 
right-right side is equivalent to OB ¢ K*, which in turn is equivalent 
to -B  q~ K* by (RO). And this latter condition can be changed into 
the left-hand side via (RO--~). 
Robert Stalnaker's (1981, pp. 98-101) proposal may be termed the 
'possibly-would-be' r ading of 'might' conditionals and formalized in 
this way: 
(PWB) 'If A then B might be the case' ¢ K iff 
<~ 'If A then B' ~ K. 
Here, due to (RO) the right-hand side amounts to - ' I f  A then B' ¢ K, 
which simply means B ¢ KX by (R-) .  On this account, a 'might' con- 
ditional could not be distinguished from a pure conditional according 
to (R). As a consequence of autoepistemic omniscience, the possibility 
operator ~. has no effect if placed before a conditional. So from the 
present point of view Stalnaker's proposal must be repudiated. 
6.  WHY ADDIT IONS ARE NOT PARASIT IC  ON EXPANSIONS 
The whole matter would present no problem at all if all belief sets 
containing 'modalized' sentences, i.e., sentences in which conditional 
connectives or [] or ~ occur, were to be constructed in a canonical 
way from somehow more basic belief sets containing only 'non-modal' 
sentences. This is the thesis of Isaac Levi (1988): 
What is the main feature of the position I am taking about belief revision? It is that all 
revisions are in the first instance revisions of corpora expressible in nonmodal language 
L. (p. 70) 
• . .  on the view being proposed here, the revisions of corpora expressible in L** [language 
with conditionals] are parasitic on the revisions of corpora expressible in L [language of 
propositional or predicate logic] (p. 66). 
Levi excludes conditionals and their relatives from belief sets ('corpora') 
because in his opinion they don't bear truth values. In Levi (1988), he 
does not offer reasons why modalized sentences are not capable of 
being true or false, and I find it hard to understand the pertinent 
exposition in Levi (1979, pp. 228-31). Recalling the analyses above (to 
which Levi would principally seem to agree), I guess that this is what 
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he has in mind: While the sentences expressible in propositional and 
predicate logic describe 'the objective world', conditionals (and the 
like) appear to be only about subjective (changes of) belief. Even if it 
is not quite clear why this should suffice to refuse conditionals the 
inclusion in belief sets, it would mean a clear qualitative distinction 
between on-modal and modal sentences. 
Drawn that simply, however, the distinction would rest on a fallacy. 
One cannot infer from the form of (R), (RD), (R~) etc. that con- 
ditionals are subjective, just as one cannot gather from 
A&B~K iff A~KandB~K 
that conjunctions are about belief sets. If conditionals really were just 
about epistemic states, one could not be mistaken about conditionals. 
This is a consequence of autoepistemic omniscience. But consider the 
following example: 
If Gorbachev had died shortly after his assumption of power, 
the world's peace would be in greater danger now than it 
actually is. 
Let us take it for granted that this sentence is accepted in our current 
'knowledge base' K. It is a counterfactual conditional since both the 
antecedent, A, and the consequent, C, are presupposed to be false. 
But if we get the information, from a most reliable source, that Gorba- 
chev really died shortly after his assumption of power, we will revise 
our beliefs in an entirely different manner than under the hypothetical 
assumption of A. Since C cannot be true in the real world, the con- 
ditional must have really been false. It turns out, or is just gathered, 
that the Soviet Union has secretly put a double in the place of Gorba- 
chev, and that this man has done his job exceedingly well. Anyway, 
we shall give up the conditional 'If A then C' in the successive belief 
set K', since -C ,  being a good candidate for an analytical truth, resists 
any rational belief change. 8 
What was the reason for the error we committed by accepting the 
conditional 'If A then C' in K? On the one hand, we were wrong about 
the constitution of the real world: the world simply has not been such 
that the unrestricted nuclear arms race continued after (or because of) 
Gorbachev's untimely death. In K, the hypothetical supposition A has 
reckoned with a world in which C is true. This is why we did accept 
'If A then C'. But it was already obvious in K that on being informed 
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that Gorbachev really died so soon, the revision would be performed 
in a completely different fashion: such factual information A would at 
once make it evident hat the conditional accepted in K was erroneous. 
This example illustrates that conditionals have acceptability conditions 
referring to hypothetical revisions, but that they are nevertheless means 
of formulating statements about the real world. Hypothetical supposi- 
tions apparently induce revisions that are very different from the re- 
visions caused by new information. 9 This fundamental distinction to be 
made between the belief set K3 mentioned in the Ramsey test (R) and 
the belief set K' described in the example above also blocks G~irden- 
fors's (1988, p. 166) argument against he Ramsey test. 
The dynamics of our beliefs, I conclude, mirror reality just as beliefs 
do. There is no reason why we should not be allowed to clothe these 
dynamics in conditionals by means of (R) and put them into belief sets. 
Conditionals are not distinguished syntactically from other complex 
sentences to which we assign truth values without hesitation. Seman- 
tically, they are closely related to disposition predicates, natural aws, 
and causal expressions which all appear to represent objective features 
of the world. Levi (1988, pp. 75-78) discriminates truth value bearing 
pseudo-conditionals that properly express dispositions from genuine 
conditionals construable according to the belief revision model. But he 
does not give us ways and means how to recognize and systematically 
draw the distinction.l° Therefore, his hierarchy of first-rate sentences 
(of propositional and predicate logic) and modalized second-rate sent- 
ences, the latter being 'parasitic on' the acceptance of the former, is 
not convincing. 
All the same, let us now assume that a separation of 'objective' and 
epistemically modalized sentences i possible and necessary. Then we 
can advance a second strategy against Levi's simplifying view by consult- 
ing the arguments of 'non-monotonic' or 'autoepistemic' logics from AI 
research (see Moore, 1985 and Konolige, 1988). In everyday life we 
have to make decisions and take actions on the basis of incomplete 
knowledge. Often we do not know explicitly whether A or -A  is true, 
but in countless cases we still add A (and not -A )  to our stock of 
beliefs in order to be able to decide and do anything at all. For example, 
I do believe that the man I am talking to is not mad, that the car I 
have just driven is still roadworthy, that the little child's parents are 
alive, that Tweety, the bird, can fly, and so on. Unless proven other- 
wise, we take it for granted that these propositions do state the facts, 
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and we file these sentences (and not their negations) into our data 
bases, since they form a considerable part of the basis on which we 
must orientate ourselves and perform actions. 
This kind of sentence A which may be reckoned true ~pending proof 
to the contrary ~or 'under normal circumstances' can be inserted into 
belief sets as 'default knowledge' by means of 'axioms' of the form 
<>A--~A (which naturally are not to be read as axiom schemes now). In 
consistent stable theories of autoepistemic logic (Moore, 1985), the 
operators [] and q conform exactly to the rules (RK]) and (R~). For 
any A belonging to the scope of default knowledge, there can plainly 
be no A-ignorance: If you do not explicitly know that -A ,  then you 
will accept ~A and the axiom <>A---~A will yield the standard belief 
that A. 
In inversion of Levi's dictum, it might here be said that many non- 
dalized sentences A are 'parasitic on' the modalized sentences qA. 
This approach generates interesting philosophical nd technical prob- 
lems of its own, 11 but it cannot be denied that autoepistemic logic 
accounts for inlportant aspects of ordinary life reasoning, and it has 
proven successful, to some degree, at applications in computers. It
shows, I believe, that there is no one-way road from 'objective' sent- 
ences to epistemically modalized ones. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
G~irdenfors's attack on the combination of the Ramsey test (R) with 
the preservation criterion (P) has not been a full success. The Ramsey 
test is incompatible with the thesis that consistent revisions may be 
identified with expansions. To put it more accurately, we are able to 
demonstrate hat (R) clashes with the conjunction of (MA) and (E2). 
We could not, and neither could G~irdenfors, show a direct effect of 
(R) upon (P). 
While G~irdenfors pleads for (P) and against (R), I have been voting 
for (R) and against (E). If, after this paper's discussion, one had to 
decide, ,hat in the whole matter is inadequate, the scapegoat would 
be spotted as (MA). An unprejudiced look at Figure 2 wilt urge the 
conclusion that 'If -A  then B' ought o be in K~v~ but not in K2. The 
triviality proofs of Sections 2 and 3, therefore, cannot be directed 
against he Ramsey test. 
The problem whether to give up (MA) or (E2) resolves itself when 
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autoepistemic omniscience is recognized. Let me once again stress that 
(AEO) is not an unduly strong requirement in the context of the 
epistemological model on which this essay is based: idealizations already 
abound in the very notion of a BRM. On accepting (AEO), however, 
it becomes evident hat both (E2) and (P) - and thus afortiori (MA) 
- have intolerable consequences. This was shown by means of negated 
conditionals in Section 4. If one concentrates on 'might' conditionals 
(Section 5), the trivialization of (MA) presents no difficulties, while 
that of (E2) requires as an additional premise that negated and 'might' 
conditionals, or rather -DA and ~-A ,  be equivalent. G~irdenfors 
denies this, but only at the expense of a complete and probably irre- 
mediable renunciation of the analysis of negated conditionals. 
This renunciation, this gap, is also essential for retaining the G~irden- 
forsian program for analyzing conditionals by means of the Ramsey 
test. In Gfirdenfors (1978) and in Gfirdenfors (1988, ch. 7) the identity 
of additions and expansions i circumvented solely by G~irdenfors's 
reluctance to infer - ' I f  A then B' E K from B ~ K*. ~2 In spite of the 
immunity thus gained, Ggrdenfors opts for giving up the Ramsey test 
in the face of his triviality theorem. This does not seem sufficiently 
motivated to me. On the other hand, the abandonment of (E) which I 
have been advocating in this essay also amounts to a decisive blow to 
the program of G~irdenfors (and that of Rott, 1986). In either case, 
Gfirdenfors's epistemic reconstruction of Lewis's (1973) logic VC for 
counterfactuals is taggered. At the end of Section 4 we have seen that 
VC with its axiom scheme (A & B)--~'If A then B' cannot be adequate 
if we adopt autoepistemic omniscience. 
It is obvious that (E) is no good if taken together with (R-) ,  (R - [2]), 
(R~--~), or (RQ). As is seen immediately, expansions cannot be in- 
cluded in (weakly) non-trivial BRMs satisfying, say, (R~): Let K be 
an A-ignorant belief set; as A is not in K, we have O-A  in K and 
also in K~; but A is in K~, too, hence K~ does not conform to (R©), 
hence K~ is not in the BRM. No "A-successful" superset of an A- 
ignorant K remains within the range of validity of (R©). In fact, there 
cannot be two belief sets in a BRM satisfying (R©) that are ordered 
by proper inclusion: for all A in K-K', we have © -A  in K'-K. 
This grave diagnosis with regard to negated or 'might' conditionals 
on the one hand, and on the other the intuitive inadequacy of (MA) 
in Figure 2, arouse the suspicion that there is no monotonic belief 
change in BRMs based on languages including pure conditionals only. 
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Renaming the belief set K~vB of Figure 2 in K', it is not implausible 
to suppose that Ki ° is identical with K~. Since K2vu C_ K2 is dubious, 
it then is equally dubious whether K' C K~ °, i.e,, the preservation con- 
dition (P) applied to K', can be met. In Figure 2, 'If -A  then B' is 
thought o be in K' - Ki °. Save for very special cases, we always may 
expect o find conditionals of the form 'If -A  then . . . '  in K-K~ for 
all belief sets K and all sentences A. The greater ignorance of K gives 
way to possibilities which are lost in the more cognizant belief set K2.13 
One can speculate whether there are arguments in support of the claim 
that no two belief sets in a BRM satisfying (R) can be ordered by 
proper inclusion. But I do not have formal results to this effect. 
Starting out from the assumption that in languages including (possibly 
negated, or 'might') conditionals there cannot be two different belief 
sets K and K' with K C_ K', it is plain that the monotonicity condition 
(M) If K C K', then K* C_ K~* 
is entirely innocuous. G~irdenfors (1986) has put (M) in the center of 
his discussion of the triviality theorem, He notes that (M) immediately 
follows from (R): Let B be in K*; then we have 'If A then B' in K by 
(R), hence, by the antecedent of (M), this latter sentence also is in K', 
hence B is in Ki*, by (R) again. It may well be that G~irdenfors (1986, 
pp. 86-87; 1988, pp. 159-160) is basically right in his arguments against 
(M), but that (M) nevertheless is true - but only trivially so, owing to 
the nonexistence of proper inclusions between belief sets. Reproaching 
the Ramsey test for implying (M) does not seem a promising strategy 
to me. 14 
Another consequence of the theses and results presented above is 
that it does not make good sense any more to speak of 'expansions' 
and 'contractions'. 15 If our object language includes -D  or © with 
acceptability conditions (R - [ ] )  and (RO), then genuine expansions 
and contractions simply do not exist. The only kinds of belief or theory 
change are revisions. Accordingly, itwould be less misleading to charac- 
terize alleged expansions and contractions as revisions from the start: 
Instead of K~, which essentially is identical with K~ in G/irdenfors, 16
it may be better to write K~A, and instead of K5 better K*A or 
KS_A? 7 (It is easy to verify that (S) and (I), together with (R[~), 
R ~ [3, and (RO) respectively, guarantee success and identity of ad- 
ditions and 'contractions' thus defined.) These notations make it obvi- 
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ous that every change of belief is, in a sense, at variance with the 
original beliefs: an addition contradicts an originally admitted possibil- 
ity, a 'contraction' contradicts an originally endorsed necessity (impossi- 
bility). I hope to have made it sufficiently plausible in Section 6 that 
these contradictions are not artificially grafted on what is basically 
simple, but are deeply intertwined in the complex web of our beliefs. 
Lastly, a logical phenomenon remains irritating. If ~A is not in K, 
then we would intuitively like to equate K2 with the set of consequences 
of K and A taken together. This, we have seen, is made impossible by, 
e.g., (R©). But there is a solution which serves our needs quite well. 
The idea is that we must desist from understanding a belief set as 
one single block of beliefs, and decompose it into a body of 'explicit 
knowledge' Ke and a body of 'implicit knowledge' K; = K -Ke .  The 
entire belief set K is derived from Ke with the help of (R[]), (R - Vq), 
and (R~) and some underlying logic k. We call K thus constructed the 
closure of K~, in symbols: K = CI(Ke). In Section 6 I have argued that 
as a rule Ke will be definitely not simply the non-modal part of K, but 
will contain a lot of 'modal' information. 
What have we gained by the decomposition? The standard procedure 
is to identify K2 with the set of k-consequences of K U {A}. Regardless 
which logic k we use, it will always yield a superset of K and thus 
violate (R<)). But if we take CI(K~ U {.4}) as K2, we would of necessity 
only get a superset of K, if the closure operation were monotonic, i.e., 
if it satisfied 
If Ke C_ K', then CI(Ke) C__ CI(K'). 
But C1 is non-monotonic. More generally, research in artificial intelli- 
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gence indicates that the logic used in everyday life reasoning is non- 
monotonic. On decomposing belief sets in the way sketched above and 
employing a kind of non-monotonic logic, it is finally possible to keep 
the idea of obtaining consistent revisions (additions) by forming the 
deductive closure of the old explicit beliefs plus the new sentence to be 
accepted. The mechanism is illustrated in Figure 3. At least some of 
the intricacies potted in the course of this paper appear to be solvable 
with the help of this construction. 
NOTES 
* I wish to thank Peter G~irdenfors for a number of helpful comments, Andr6 Fuhrmann 
and Wolfgang Spohn for extensive discussion of parts of this paper, and Winfred Klink 
for kindly checking my English. 
1 Actually, (C) is raissing in many papers of G~irdenfors. In his epistemological develop- 
ment of Lewis's (1973) system VC (G~irdenfors 1978; 1988, chap. 7) for example, (C) is 
ignored. This is not surprising, because Lewis allows conditionals to be 'vacuously' true 
even if their antecedents are noncontradictory, which would be excluded by (C). 
2 G~irdenfors uses a slightly different concept of 'non-trivial BRM'. 
3 Because I- includes modus ponens as a (perhaps derived) rule of inference and satisfies 
the deduction theorem. 
4 Rott (1986) suggested that the principal acceptability condition of conditionals hould 
be a combination of (R2) and (R3), viz., 
(R4) 'If A then B' ~ K iff B ~ (KB)~ & B ¢: (KT~)*A. 
On presupposing (S-), (I) and (E) (in fact one only needs the half called (E2) below), 
however, it is easy to see that (R4) is equivalent to (R4) is equivalent to (R3). Plainly, 
the right-hand side of (R4) implies the right-hand side of (R3). Conversely, we have to 
show that B ~ (KS)*A follows from B E (K})X. Suppose for reductio that B is in both 
(K})3 and (KB)-~A. Then (I) implies that neither A nor -A  can be in KS; otherwise (S )  
would be violated. Using (E), then, the supposition says that both A ~ B and -A  ~ B are 
in K}, but now, by propositional logic, B is in the belief set K} as well, in contradiction to 
(S - ) .  
s Conjunctivity is definitely out of place as a general requirement for all revisions. See 
Rott (1988). 
6 Be careful not 'to confuse autoepistemic omniscience with Stalnaker's (1981) 'Con- 
ditional Excluded Middle', i.e., with the axiom scheme 'If A then B' v 'If A then ~B'.  
7 The same comment applies to (R( ) )  below. Of particular elevance are Levi's (1979; 
1988) 'serious possibility', Moore's (1985) 'autoepistemic logic', and Fuhrmann's (1.989) 
'reflective modatities'. 
s Examples that can be utilized in a similar manner are found in Ramsey (1931, p. 
249), Mackie (1962, p. 71), Adams (1970, pp. 90), and Stalnaker (1984, pp. 105-106). 
Presumably there is a close connection between the dichotomies "new information vs. 
hypothetical supposition' and 'indicative vs. subjunctive conditionals'. 
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9 Both kinds of revision, though, seem to satisfy the same sets of rationality criteria h la 
G~irdenfors. The difference probably lies in divergent relations of 'epistemic entrench- 
ment' (cf. G~rdenfors 1988, chap. 4) which underlie these revision variants. 
10 There are still more kinds of conditionals in Levi. If for exampIe the antecedent is of 
the form ( )A, then, according to Levi (1988, pp. 70-72), the conditional must be analyzed 
by considering the contraction K~,A. Levi offers no unified analysis of conditionals which 
could be compared to (R). He thus violates the sound methodological hypothesis that - 
pace Dudman (1984; 1986) - different messages be encoded differently. The principal 
uses of 'if' should be covered by one single explication; 'might', grammatical moods and 
tenses in conditionals hould be accounted for in such a fashion that the principle of 
compositionality is obeyed. In my opinion, Dudman's work does not conclusively establish 
that this aim is unattainable. 
11 For instance, there generally is, for a given 'axiom set' K0 (closed under first-order 
consequence), no unique superset K which is first-order closed and satisfies (R()) .  
Example: (the first-order closure of) K0 = {( ),4---~-B, ( )B--+-A}. If K0 is expressible 
in first-order language, however, existence and uniqueness of K are guaranteed. See 
Moore (1985) and Konofige (1988). 
12 The crucial point is G~irdenfors's condition 
If ~' I f  A then -B '  C K, then (K*)~ __. K*~B. 
Using (R - )  and (I) and substituting T for A, we could at once obtain (E) from this 
condition and G~irdenfors's further condition K.~aa_C (K*)}. Without (R - ) ,  this fault 
does not arise, but then the condition quoted cannot virtually be understood. The critical 
question is: Under which circumstances is the negated conditional - ' I f  A then -B '  to 
be accepted in K? 
The analogous problem concerning (P) instead of (E) has already been pointed out by 
Isaac Levi (1988, pp. 68 and 80). 
13 Unless we are facing the very special case that a 'memory' is built in K~ by means of 
a relation of epistemic entrenchment which dictates that on hypothetically assuming ~A, 
we should move from K2 via K to K2A. In general, however, such a memory evaluating 
the most recent information as lowest does not seem desirable. 
14 To be sure, G~irdenfors has more arguments against he Ramsey test. 
is My choice of the label 'addition', I admit, is somewhat unhappy, too. It can only be 
justified by my failure to find a more appropriate name. 
16 But see footnote 12 and the pertaining text. 
a7 In his arguments against Levi, Fuhrmann (1989, p. 14) advances a converse proposal. 
He defines revisions as special contractions by means of K* = K2 2 a. 
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